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Tax evasion represents a serious loss to the 
exchequer in most developed and developing 
economies. Various approaches to combat this 
problem have been put forward, including 
increasing penalties for non-compliance, 
boosting revenue powers of search and 
discovery, the use of amnesties to bring errant 
taxpayers into the net, high-profile public 
prosecutions and other “name and shame” 
techniques, and appeal to the ethics of taxpayers. 
This paper looks at the approaches adopted in 
two contrasting economies, South Africa and 
Ireland, examines the strategies which were 
adopted in each case, and concludes that 
similarities in approach outweigh differences, 
suggesting some universality in Revenue 
techniques. 
 
Keywords: tax evasion, tax avoidance, South Africa, Ireland 
 
I : Introduction  
Tax avoidance can be described as the avoidance, 
reduction or postponement of a taxpayer’s liability for tax by 
means that are legal and within the provisions of the law. It has 
long been accepted by the courts in many countries, including 
both South Africa and Ireland that tax avoidance is a legitimate 
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activity that taxpayers are entitled to pursue, however 
unpopular the results of their activities may be to the fiscal 
authorities. A major influence in both countries was the seminal 
UK judgment in IRC v Duke of Westminster, in which Lord 
Tomlin stated: 
 
Every man is entitled, if he can, to so order his 
affairs so that the tax attaching under the 
appropriate Acts is less than it would otherwise 
be. If he succeeds in ordering them so as to 
secure this result, then, however unappreciative 
the Commissioners of Inland Revenue or his 
fellow taxpayers may be of his ingenuity, he 
cannot be compelled to pay an increased tax.                         
(IRC v Duke of Westminster 1936, 19) 
 
In contrast, tax evasion can be described as an illegal, 
dishonest activity that entails the evasion of a taxpayer’s 
existing liability for tax on income, for example, either by the 
taxpayer not declaring the income or by claiming deductions 
against income to which he is not entitled. Tax evasion is 
simply a fraud against the fiscus for which appropriate 
penalties are usually provided in tax legislation. 
Much tax research is dedicated to the question of 
whether or not taxes can, or should influence behaviour. 
Central to the idea of tax neutrality is that taxes do not impact 
on taxpayer behaviour, and this neutrality is often cited as a 
goal in an efficient tax system. However, tax systems are rarely 
truly neutral. Mintz (1996, 41) observes that: 
 
Governments rarely try to achieve [tax] 
neutrality … they purposely try to influence 
investment behaviour by giving special 
exemptions or deductions.                                                           
 
Governments in all jurisdictions use the tax system, not 
only as a source of revenue, but also as a tool to influence 
taxpayer behaviour, despite the associated costs. For example, 
Scholes and Wolfson (1992, 4)  identify three such non-neutral 
purposes, as follows: 
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Among other things, taxes are designed to (1) 
finance public projects …(2) redistribute wealth 
… and (3) encourage a variety of economic 
activities that are deemed to be in the public 
interest.    
                                                              
Cooke (1995) argues that such tax incentives constitute 
a deliberate case of the government exploiting the taxpayers’ 
natural inclination towards tax avoidance, and that this weakens 
the moral position of government introducing general anti-
avoidance legislation.  
The scale of tax evasion is by its nature difficult to 
quantify. Franzoni (1998) in a review article notes that previous 
studies have estimated evasion levels at 5% to 25% for Western 
industrialized countries, and up to 30% to 40% for developing 
countries. While this represents a serious loss of revenue to the 
government, it also creates moral hazard for taxpayers wishing 
to avoid a free rider problem, increasing the likelihood that 
more taxpayers will understate their income. In short, evasion 
begets evasion.  
The techniques used by governments to tackle tax 
evasion can be categorised into those which define and 
criminalise tax evasion, those which punish evasion, those 
which forgive evaders and allow them to re-enter the formal 
economy, and those which appeal to, or seek to create group 
norms of compliant behaviour. The first category includes the 
development of anti-avoidance legislation and case law, which 
define the boundary between legitimate avoidance and criminal 
non-compliance. The second includes revenue powers of 
detection, the threat of audit and financial and custodial 
penalties for evasion. The third category comprises settlements 
and amnesties. The fourth category is more nebulous, and 
includes efforts by government to appeal to the ethics of 
taxpayers, to stigmatize evasion by “name and shame” 
techniques, and to create a climate in which most taxpayers will 
voluntarily report full income.  
The paper is set out as follows: Section II considers 
theoretical issues around each of the four approaches to tax 
evasion, and reviews the relevant literature. Sections III and IV 
analyze the cases of South Africa and Ireland in turn, setting 
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out the institutional context within each country, the 
background to and application of use of each of the four 
categories of anti-evasion techniques, and appraising the 
success or otherwise of the measures. Section V concludes.   
 
II : Approaches to Tax Evasion 
Clearly, the powers of the taxing authorities to penalize 
evasion should influence the level of compliance. (Franzoni 
1998) identifies four influences on taxpayers’ attitudes to 
compliance and evasion. These are the attitude to government 
and public institutions, the fairness or perceived fairness of the 
tax system, prevailing social norms and the chances of 
incurring penalties for non-compliance. Most research in this 
area has focused on the last of those factors.  
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) analyze tax evasion as a 
portfolio issue. Their idea is that taxpayers and potential tax 
evaders decide, based on their risk-preferences, how much of 
their income to declare as low-risk, low-return “declared and 
taxable” income, and how much to allocate to the higher-return, 
and higher-risk “non-declared” category. The amount of risk 
associated with the latter category depends, inter alia on the 
risk of an audit and the penalties attaching to non-compliance. 
The rewards for non-declaration depend on the tax rate. The 
interesting conclusion from their analysis is that since the 
penalties for evasion tend to correlate with the amount of tax 
evaded, a high tax rate actually gives rise to lower evasion, so 
long as there is a reasonable chance of detection and 
prosecution.  
Under this model, and given a set tax rate, enforcement 
policy must center on improving the detection rate through 
more audits, and/or increasing penalties for evasion. Franzoni 
(1998) points out that since increasing audits has resource 
implications for government, while increasing penalties does 
not, this leads to the conclusion that the optimal policy is to 
infrequently impose draconian fines. Some researchers argue 
that a slightly more sophisticated policy, which uses the 
revenue audit selectively, is preferable. For example, 
Reinganum and Wilde (1985) show that where an audit results 
directly from reported income being low relative to taxpayer 
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norms, this will have a deterrent effect, which will increase net 
revenue from the tax concerned.  
Settlements and amnesties are complementary tools 
used by the taxing authorities to maximise revenue. Settlements 
occur where that part of the revenue service charged with 
collecting tax reaches an agreement with a particular taxpayer, 
based on the individual circumstances of the case, whereby the 
taxpayer will “settle” his tax liability by payment of an agreed 
lump sum which is less than the full tax and penalties which 
could accrue under the anti-evasion rules in force. The taxpayer 
agrees to pay, and not contest or appeal the facts of the case, 
and the revenue service agree not to pursue the full potential 
liability. 
An amnesty is a more general form of settlement, 
applying identical terms to a wide range of taxpayers. It may 
apply to a particular class of income, such as offshore accounts, 
to specific non-compliance such as filing of returns or record-
keeping, or to under-declared income more generally. The 
terms offered may be a waiver of interest and penalties, or in 
some cases the application of a lower than statutory tax rate to 
the income concerned. In all cases amnesties are introduced 
without prejudice to the government’s powers to collect tax, 
and with a set time limit in which taxpayers are invited to avail 
of their terms. Tax amnesties have been applied in many 
countries, including Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Bolivia, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, Finland, France, Greece, 
India, Italy, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Portugal, Mexico, 
Switzerland, and more than half of the United States of 
America1.  
A standard criticism of both settlements and amnesties 
is that they foster opportunism among taxpayers, providing an 
incentive to under-declare income, secure in the belief that 
officially-sanctioned penalties will not be applied in full. 
Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (2002) disagree, applying a 
principal-agent model to settlements, and concluding that even 
where settlements are widely anticipated by taxpayers, it may 
be ex-ante optimal for the tax administration to commit to their 
                                                 
1 Source: Intriago 1999. 
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use when they have some credible signal about the true level of 
the taxpayers’ income.  
Amnesties are often held to have stronger demotivation 
effects on compliant taxpayers, since they apply across the 
board and do not rely on any taxpayer-specific information. 
However, researchers such as Marchese and Privileggi (1999) 
provide an economic justification for their use, drawing on the 
economic theory of plea bargaining, noting that they save the 
tax administration the time and effort involved in convicting 
tax evaders. They further observe that most amnesties offer 
greater savings in terms of tax, interest and penalties to those 
taxpayers who have most undeclared income. Because of this, 
in the same way as plea-bargaining, amnesties induce self-
selection among the taxpayers who choose to avail of the 
amnesty, maximising participation by the more “guilty”.  
Marchese and Cassone (1998) have an interesting 
approach to the analysis of tax amnesties, seeing them as a 
form of price discrimination by government. Their thesis is that 
by paying tax, taxpayers are effectively buying immunity from 
prosecution for tax evasion. In this context, an amnesty can be 
seen as offering the same “service” to previously non-
compliant taxpayers at a discount. Thus in the same way as 
price discrimination can be an optimal strategy commercially, 
as long as the premium market is unaffected by the presence of 
the discount product, even perfectly-anticipated tax amnesties 
can be a sound government strategy. 
Against this must be set the more qualified support for 
amnesties in Torgler and Schaltegger (2002) who find them to 
be most effective when combined with an increase in penalties 
for non-compliance, and when they do not recur, so that 
taxpayers’ anticipation of a future amnesty does not induce 
further under-reporting of income.  
The Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model earlier 
described has been criticized2 on the basis that it assumes 
taxpayers are perfectly amoral. To the extent that ethics or 
social factors influence compliance rates, the level of evasion 
could be far lower than previously predicted. Galbati and 
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Zanardi (2001) in an empirical analysis of Italian taxpayers’ 
attitudes find that the decision of taxpayers on how much 
income to declare and how much to evade is centred, rather 
than on risk-aversion and the likely penalties for non-
compliance, on attaining an average after-tax income close to 
the mean for their socio-economic peers. In this model, where 
evasion is prevalent and after-tax income is correspondingly 
high, more taxpayers are encouraged to mirror the “normal” 
behaviour and evade some tax. Tyran and Feld (2002) use an 
experimental model to reach similar conclusions, finding that 
even where sanctions against tax evasion are not severe, 
taxpayers tend to report income fully if they expect others to do 
the same.  
Achieving this level of social norming on tax 
compliance is clearly desirable from a government. Tyran and 
Feld (2002,4) note that the work of social psychologists 
suggests that social norms must be activated, or brought to 
mind before they can influence behaviour. They observe that 
this can be achieved either by deliberate reminders or by more 
subtle measures, such as observation of the behaviour of others. 
For example, several field studies3 find that people are far less 
likely to litter in a clean, non-littered environment. This latter 
effect can only be applied to tax compliance if the revenue or 
government makes compliance levels overtly visible to 
taxpayers. One way to approach this is by publishing aggregate 
data on tax compliance, where this is high. Arguably, however, 
higher visibility can be obtained by stigmatizing tax evasion 
through “naming and shaming” of high-profile individuals. 
This approach has been followed in both South Africa and 
Ireland, as discussed further below.  
A further contribution to taxpayer alienation may 
perversely lie in the very legislation introduced to encourage 
compliance. Franzoni (1998) recommends that legislatures 
avoid countering evasion by increasing the complexity of tax 
regulations, because this will increase compliance costs for 
taxpayers. He notes that: 
 
                                                 
3 See for example (Cialdini et al 1990). 
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High compliance costs, which may be due to 
complex tax schedules and rates, not only tilt the 
“cost-benefit analysis” towards evasion, but may 
also generate resentment, weakening taxpayers’ 
moral conscience or even prompting them to 
evade as a form of “punishment” for the tax 
administration.                                                 
(Franzoni 1998, 16) 
 
Some researchers4 argue that it is unlikely that 
taxpayers will use evasion as a form of protest, given that this 
could more easily and effectively be achieved by voting the 
offending government out of office. However, McGee (1999, 
156) points out that: 
   … .. a wasteful public sector or government 
cannot easily be changed via the ballot box. The 
literature that has been generated by the Public 
Choice School of Economics over the last thirty 
years makes that clear.  
  
Given that anti-avoidance legislation tends to take over-
arching precedence over a complex array of specific provisions 
in the tax code, this is a real risk in both South Africa and 
Ireland. 
 
III : The Case of South Africa 
3.1: Background 
The birth of the new democratic South Africa in April 
1994 when the ANC government was installed with President 
Nelson Mandela at its head, brought to an end an era of 
isolation and economic sanctions for the country. Since 1994, 
many aspects of South African society have undergone 
significant reform, including the tax system.  
The aggressive use of tax avoidance schemes, often 
based on sophisticated financing structures, had become 
widespread in South Africa during the 1980s and involved 
significant losses of tax revenue. The tax reform process during 
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the years 1994 to 1999 was mainly concerned with the 
administration of the tax system, the collection of taxes and 
closing the tax-gap.  
 
3.2: Tax avoidance and evasion 
The South African Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 contains 
a general anti-avoidance provision and a number of specific 
anti-avoidance provisions that the Commissioner for the South 
African Revenue Service (SARS) may use against tax 
avoidance schemes. These provisions have been introduced and 
have evolved over many years, often in response to decisions of 
the courts. 
Section 103(1) is the general anti-avoidance provision. 
The Commissioner may use its provisions to determine the 
liability of a taxpayer who has entered into a transaction which 
has the effect of avoiding his tax liability if there is an element 
of abnormality about the transaction and if his sole or main 
purpose in entering into the transaction was to avoid, postpone 
or reduce his tax liability. Where the provisions of s 103(1) can 
be applied to a tax avoidance scheme, the Commissioner is 
entitled to determine the taxpayer’s liability tax as if the 
transaction had not been entered into or in whatever manner he 
deems appropriate. 
As the use of tax avoidance schemes became 
widespread, the successful application of the provisions of s 
103(1) to counter the schemes became more difficult because 
various elements of the schemes were so commonplace that it 
was difficult for the Commissioner to argue that they were 
abnormal. A business purpose test was therefore introduced 
into s 103(1) in 1996. In the case of a transaction  entered into 
in the context of business, the requirements of the business 
purpose test will be satisfied if either the transaction was 
entered into in a manner which would not normally be 
employed for bona fide business purposes, other than the 
obtaining of a tax benefit, or if the transaction has created rights 
or obligations which would not normally be created between 
persons dealing at arm’s length under a transaction of the 
nature of the transaction in question.  
Although the Duke of Westminster principle that a 
taxpayer cannot be compelled to pay an increased tax has been 
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accepted by the courts in South Africa, tax avoidance schemes 
have been under attack in South Africa in recent years.  
Gordhan (1999), the Commissioner for the South 
African Revenue Service, in an article written whilst he was 
still Deputy Commissioner, quoted from Plato’s Republic in 
support of the view that paying less tax is unjust: 
 
When there is an income tax, the just man will 
pay more and the unjust less on the same 
amount of income. 
 
Outright disapproval of tax avoidance has been shown 
in the judgments in a number of cases involving tax avoidance 
schemes, for example, in CIR v Ocean Manufacturing Ltd tax 
avoidance was referred to as a mischief that needs to be 
suppressed. 
The South African courts have concerned themselves 
with the question of the substance of a transaction as opposed 
to its form and have not hesitated where appropriate to rend 
aside the veil in which a transaction is wrapped and to examine 
its true nature and substance. In Erf 3183/1 Ladysmith (Pty) 
Ltd and Another v CIR, the principle of substance over form 
was applied to ignore the tax avoidance scheme in question: it 
was therefore not necessary for the court to consider whether 
the anti-avoidance provisions of s 103(1) could be applied to 
the scheme. 
 
3.3: Revenue Powers and Penalties 
The Commissioner for the South African Revenue 
Service has extensive powers that enable him to obtain 
information for the purposes of an audit or inspection and to 
call on a taxpayer’s business premises during normal working 
hours, with reasonable prior notice, in order to obtain 
information or documents. In addition, on application to a 
judge of the High Court, a warrant may be issued authorizing 
an officer to enter and search any premises or to search any 
person on the premises for the purposes of obtaining any 
documents or information. Any relevant information or 
documents may be seized during a search. (Sections 74A and 
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74B.) These powers reflect the solution identified by Franzoni 
(1998) of draconian powers that are rarely applied.  
SARS makes extensive use of audits to improve 
collections. The 2003 SARS Annual Report states that risk 
profiling has been introduced to improve audit effectiveness. 
The audit process has been enhanced by the use of the SESAM 
audit tool that enables auditors to scrutinize and select from 
data within a taxpayer’s business systems.  The value of 
additional assessments raised by the SARS auditors amounted 
to R20.7 million for the 2003/03 fiscal year, being an increase 
of 101% on the amount for the 2001/02 fiscal year. The 
findings of Reinganum and Wilde (1985) are clearly being 
applied by SARS: audit is being used both as a deterrent and as 
a detection tool. 
The Income Tax Act provides for penalties for tax 
evasion that include fines or imprisonment for a period of up to 
five years (section 104). Additional tax of up to twice the 
amount properly payable on the amount evaded may be levied 
(section 76). 
 
3.4: Settlements and Amnesties 
The South African Income Tax Act provides remedies 
for taxpayers who are aggrieved by their tax assessments. 
Subject to certain requirements, an aggrieved taxpayer may 
object to an assessment (section 81). If the taxpayer’s objection 
is unsuccessful, he may then appeal either to the special board 
for hearing income tax appeals (if the tax in dispute is below a 
certain amount, currently R30,000) or to the tax court. From the 
tax court both the taxpayer and the Commissioner have the 
right of appeal to the High Court and on to the Supreme Court 
of Appeal, where necessary.  
To expedite the settlement of disputes between SARS 
and taxpayers without the necessity of going to court, there is a 
dispute resolution process that enables the Commissioner to 
settle disputes with taxpayers where this would be to the 
advantage of the state (section 107B). 
There have been two amnesties in South Africa since 
the change of government in 1994. The first amnesty, 
announced in 1995, was aimed at persons who had not 
previously registered as taxpayers. The Katz Commission had 
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recommended in its first interim report that an amnesty be 
introduced, for a number of reasons.  
There was a possibly valid argument that previously 
disenfranchised people should not have had to pay taxes under 
the prior system of government and should be encouraged to 
come forward and register without being penalized. The 
attraction of additional people into the tax system would result 
in additional revenue for the fiscus.  
The concept of an amnesty was familiar as the 
introduction of the new political dispensation had resulted in 
the use of amnesties in other spheres of human activities in 
South Africa. An extensive media campaign was launched to 
promote the amnesty that resulted in a response described by 
government as gratifying although there were many people who 
chose not to take advantage of the amnesty. By the time that the 
period for making amnesty applications closed 23,200 
applications had been received. 
The second amnesty was announced in 2003 and was 
aimed at assisting taxpayers who had transgressed the South 
African exchange control regulations by transferring funds 
offshore without proper authorization. As a result of the 
introduction of the worldwide basis of taxation in South Africa 
in 2001, those taxpayers found themselves in the difficult 
position that if they declared their offshore earnings for tax 
purposes, their transgression of exchange control regulations 
would be revealed.  
As the final date for the submission of amnesty 
applications is 29 February 2004, it is not possible at the time 
of writing this article to assess the success of this amnesty, 
either in terms of the number of taxpayers who take advantage 
of it or in the amounts of offshore funds declared and 
effectively brought into the tax net.    
 
3.5: Group Norming Techniques 
SARS is committed to broadening the tax base and 
improving the tax compliance culture of South Africans. In its 
2003 Annual Report, SARS estimates that of an estimated 11.3 
million individuals economically active in South Africa, only 
7.4 million are known to SARS, leaving 3.9 million individuals 
who are not registered for tax purposes.  
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The two amnesties that were made available to errant 
taxpayers were highly visible ways of attempting to encourage 
them to come into the tax system and to influence attitudes to 
tax compliance generally.     
Naming and shaming is another of the tools that have 
been used by SARS in its efforts to broaden the tax base.  The 
ability of SARS to utilize this tool is, however, restricted by the 
secrecy provisions in the tax legislation. The Commissioner 
and officers employed by SARS are bound by strict secrecy 
provisions with regard to the tax affairs of taxpayers (for 
example, section 4 of the Income Tax Act that prohibits 
disclosure of information except in limited circumstances).  
Provision is, however, made for the publication of the 
names of offenders in certain circumstances (section 75A) and 
for the reporting of unprofessional conduct by tax advisers to 
their professional bodies (section 105A). Despite frequent 
complaints by SARS that professional advisers assist taxpayers 
in their transgressions, few reports in terms of section 105A 
have been made by SARS in the past. 
In recent years, a number of high profile taxpayers who 
have been involved in disputes with SARS have found 
themselves in the media spotlight whilst still in negotiation 
with SARS. It appears that eagerness to ‘make an example’ of 
errant taxpayers has sometimes resulted in secrecy provisions 
being somewhat overlooked. 
 
IV : The Case of Ireland  
As in the case of South Africa, this section sets out a 
brief background to the tax system in Ireland, outlines the 
distinction as it applies between tax avoidance and evasion, and 
describes the use of the various techniques to combat the 
problem of evasion.  
 
 4.1: Background 
Since Ireland’s independence from Britain in 1922, it 
has followed a number of fiscal strategies to improve the 
economy, the most recent of which centres on attracting foreign 
direct investment through low corporate tax rates and a 
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generous system of grants to new businesses5. Personal Income 
tax rates have been, by contrast, rather high, with marginal 
rates as high as 56% in the 1990s. This has created considerable 
incentives over the years to under-declare personal income. 
Most employees pay tax at source,6 while self-employed 
individuals and company directors have always had wider 
scope for evasion.   
 
4.2: Avoidance and Evasion 
Specific anti-avoidance rules in Ireland have largely 
developed as a response to case-law, with legislation hastily 
introduced to close loopholes highlighted by cases found in 
favour of the taxpayer. Since the legal and tax rules in Ireland 
and Britain share a common origin, it is not uncommon for 
Irish legislation to be introduced in reaction to a UK case.  The 
general anti-avoidance provisions arose indirectly, in a similar 
way.  
As in South Africa, the original guiding case was that of 
the IRC v The Duke of Westminster, ruling every taxpayer is 
entitled to take reasonable steps to arrange affairs so as to 
minimise his or her tax liability. The landscape changed 
following the UK cases of W.T. Ramsay Ltd. v. IRC, Eilbeck 
(IoT)  v Rawling (1981, STC1 74) and Furniss v Dawson 
(1984, STC 153)7 in which the principle of fiscal nullity was 
applied by the UK courts to look through the legal form of the 
transactions, and to infer that the substantial purpose was to 
avoid tax. In a  subsequent landmark Irish case, McGrath vs 
McDermott (3 ITR 683)8, in which a paper loss was offset 
against a real gain, the Irish courts diverged from their UK 
counterparts, and found in favour of the taxpayer, rejecting 
fiscal nullity.  
This led directly to the introduction in Ireland of general 
anti-avoidance legislation in section 86 of the Finance Act 1989 
(now 811 of the 1997 Taxes Consolidation Act), with the stated 
                                                 
5 See Gottheil (2003) for a comprehensive review of the evolution of the Irish 
economy. 
6 Under the PAYE (pay as you earn) system. 
7 All available in Saunders and Dolton (2003). 
8 Available in Irish Tax Reports, Butterworths.  
Journal of Accounting, Ethics & Public Policy 
Volume 4, No. 4 (2004) 
 
249 
purpose of counteracting schemes with little or no commercial 
reality, motivated primarily by a desire to avoid tax.  
Essentially, S.811 allows the revenue commissioners, 
where they form the opinion that a transaction or series of 
transactions amounts to a “tax avoidance transaction”, to 
calculate the tax advantage arising therefrom, and make 
whatever adjustments necessary to recover the lost revenue. 
The primary test is that of commercial purpose.  An 
arrangement cannot be categorised as a tax avoidance 
transaction if the primary purpose was business rather than tax 
planning, or if it is a response to a specific tax incentive. The 
legislation is sweeping in its scope, affording the Irish Revenue 
Commissioners a great deal of discretion to look through the 
legal form of any series of deals to divine the underlying 
substance of transactions.  
Clearly this has posed a significant threat to aggressive 
tax planning.  However, Judge (1998,427) notes that  almost 
ten years after its introduction, there were no known cases in 
which it had been fully applied to the point of a final 
settlement. This may be a deliberate policy on the part of the 
Revenue Commissioners. Cooke (1995, 1363) argues that the 
general anti-avoidance legislation constitutes “a far more potent 
instrument as long as it remains an untested threat”.   
Certainly the threat remains. Current advice in 
practitioner journals is typified by Fitzgerald (1999, 182) which 
recommends taking advantage of all possible legislative 
opportunities, “while sailing close to the S.811 wind”. 
O’Hanlon (1999) describes the legislation as hanging like a 
sword of Damocles over tax avoidance schemes. He also 
questions the fact that it has never been tested, and notes that it 
would be ironic if it were rejected by the courts and found to 
have more form than substance. Unsurprisingly, there is 
widespread opposition to the law among Irish tax practitioners. 
Carr (1998) describes it as bad law, suggesting that the 
professional institutes should campaign for its removal.  
While the Irish tax authorities officially distinguish 
between tax avoidance and evasion, their attitude to both 
appears equally jaundiced. Taylor (2003, 13) quotes Michael 
O’Grady, one of the three Irish Revenue Commissioners as 
saying:  
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What is objectionable to Revenue is an attitude 
that regards the tax code as fair game to be 
combed through for gaps or unintended effects 
                                                                                 
This illustrates what Kelly (1999) calls the “Irish 
Revenue’s obsession with legitimate tax avoidance and tax 
planning rather than evasion”. 
 
4.3: Revenue Powers and Penalties 
Revenue audits were introduced in Ireland in 1988, and 
can range from a desk audit covering a specific tax head or 
aspect of compliance to a full comprehensive field audit, 
involving a visit to the taxpayer’s premises, and examination of 
records.   It was widely known at the time of introduction that 
the probability of incurring an audit was increased if reported 
income was low relative to industry norms, exploiting the 
revenues informational advantage.  
The number of field audits has declined slightly but 
steadily in recent years, while total return from the audits has 
increased, as taxpayer selection becomes less random. In 
March, 2003 the Irish tax authorities commissioned risk 
analysis software will be introduced in early 2004 for selection 
of cases for audit. All taxpayers are assigned a risk score, by 
reference to their filing and payment records, and their reported 
income is compared to that of taxpayers in similar industry/size 
categories.  
Inter alia, the system aims to target risky cases in a 
timely way, and reduce contact with compliant taxpayers.  In 
this way, as in South Africa, the Irish Revenue are applying the 
findings of Reinganum and Wilde (1985), and using audit as a 
deterrent as well as a detection tool. Random audits also 
continue to feature, with each tax district selecting some 
taxpayers for audit at random in each year, accounting for a 
total of about 2.5% of all audits.  
On an audit, the revenue officials have power to enter a 
premises, demand records going back six years, and to enquire 
from anyone on the premises who might reasonably have 
information on the taxpayers liability, including employees and 
customers. The powers are sweeping, but seldom used. In that 
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respect they echo the optimal solution identified by Franzoni 
(1998) of draconian powers, rarely applied.   
The most recent report by the Office of the Comptroller 
and Auditor General9 into the anti-avoidance measures taken by 
the revenue commissioners suggests that the system is “under 
pressure to cope” and in need of further resource allocation. A 
particular cause of concern was that up to one third of fines 
remained uncollected at year end. 
 
4.4: Settlements and Amnesties 
The Irish Revenue has always had a policy of 
assessment, appeal and settlement. A taxpayer who disagrees 
with a Revenue estimate of tax due may appeal within 30 days 
to have the case heard before an appeal commissioner, 
appointed by the Minister for Finance under Section 850 of 
Taxes Consolidation Act, 1997 (previously Section 156 of 
Income Tax Act, 1967). If unhappy with the decision of the 
appeal commissioners, the taxpayer can appeal to the circuit 
court on a point of fact, or the high court on a point of law. The 
vast majority of cases are settled at the appeal commissioner 
stage, however, and in general, some waiving of interest and 
penalties is implicit in the settlement.  
Two general amnesties have been introduced. The first, 
in 1988, was a general amnesty, under the terms of which 
errant taxpayers were invited to declare income previously 
under-reported, and pay a low rate of 15% with no interest or 
penalties. The amnesty was enormously successful. Over 
170,000 people availed of it, and it raised revenue equal to 
2.5% of gross domestic product in the year, facilitating cuts in 
income tax rates over the following years. The response was 
more than 15 times that which had been anticipated.  
A second amnesty was introduced in 1993. The terms 
were less attractive, and uptake was generally lower. In 
addition, the amnesty attracted controversy, as the media had 
begun to cover stories of high-profile political figures involved 
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in tax evasion. All the major political parties in Ireland are now 
generally against tax amnesties, as a matter of policy.  
 
4.5: Group Norming Techniques 
The Irish Revenue’s policy is to encourage voluntary 
compliance: 
Our whole strategy as tax administrators is built 
around the idea of voluntary compliance – of 
increasing the stock of “social capital” that 
prompts people to comply with their tax 
obligations even when they’re unlikely to be 
found out if they don’t. (O’Grady 2003, 8) 
 
In spite of this stated objective, they have taken 
relatively few steps to shift attitudes to tax evasion in the 
country. The names of taxpayers who have reached settlement 
with the tax authorities are published in Iris Oifigiúl10, the 
official publication of the Revenue Commissioners. However, 
this is a paper consisting solely of official government notices, 
with no circulation outside of professional offices, and is 
unlikely to achieve social norming through the “name and 
shame” technique.  
In cases where the decision of appeal commissioners in 
a particular case is of general applicability, and concerns 
interpretation of some statute, the main findings are published 
online at http://www.appealcommissioners.ie/  However, this is 
done in such as way as to protect the anonymity of the taxpayer 
as far as possible.  
More mainstream media coverage was given to a 
number of high-profile enquiries held into tax evasion through 
the holding of offshore and non-resident bank accounts. Many 
of these have come to light indirectly through tribunals of 
enquiry into government corruption, particularly in the area of 
planning. In the case of many payments from companies to 
politicians it was unclear where the money had come from, or 
whether or not it arose from taxed profits. This led to some 
                                                 
10 Available online at http://www.irisoifigiuil.ie/ 
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individual businesses and politicians being castigated in the 
media for tax evasion.  
Since 1986, interest earned on bank deposits held by 
Irish residents has been subject to a withholding tax called 
Deposit Interest Retention Tax (DIRT) at the standard rate of 
21%, while interest on non-resident accounts is paid free of 
DIRT. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, a number of Irish 
banks encouraged their Irish-resident customers to open non-
resident deposit accounts, in order to evade this tax.  
Other methods of evading tax being promoted at the 
time by Irish banks involved depositing funds in accounts held 
offshore, with a credit facility in place to effectively make the 
money available in the customers local branch in Ireland. The 
most notorious of these schemes was operated by Guinness and 
Mahon, a private bank in Dublin, and involved a number of 
high-profile political figures holding accounts in Ansbacher 
Bank in the Cayman Islands. This scheme was co-coordinated 
by the financial advisor to a former prime minister of Ireland, 
Charles Haughey, and the political fallout from the uncovering 
of the list of account holders was substantial. Again, a tribunal 
was set up to deal with the issue and several individuals were 
“named and shamed”.  
A recent example of successful social norming by the 
Irish Revenue authorities was the environmental levy on plastic 
bags introduced by the Waste Management Act, 2001. Under 
this legislation, a 15c levy was imposed at the point of retail 
sale on lightweight plastic shopping bags. Prior to the 
introduction of the tax, an extensive media campaign was 
undertaken, explaining the problems caused by plastic bags 
entering the waste stream, and exhorting taxpayers to pay the 
levy or avoid the use of plastic bags, and help to preserve the 
environment.  
Studies such as Killian (2003) show that the advertising 
campaign helped change taxpayers’ attitudes, and reduce 
dramatically the number of plastic bags in use, with minimal 
evasion of the levy. Such an approach would be more difficult, 
though not impossible, for evasion of more mainstream taxes. 
However, Taylor (2003) explains that as of November 2003, 
the Irish Revenue intend to start a process to change taxpayer 
attitudes by appealing to large firms and high-income taxpayers 
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to adopt “co-operative frameworks” in the spirit of social 
responsibility. However, he also quotes Michael O’Grady, one 
of the three Irish Revenue Commissioners as saying: 
 
If it is wishful thinking to believe that aggressive 
tax avoidance can be moderated by this 
approach, then it seems inevitable that there will 
be an ongoing escalation in both legislative    
and administrative counter measures.                                                           
(Taylor 2003, 13)       
 
V :  Conclusions 
Clearly, Ireland and South Africa have followed a 
similar path in framing general anti-avoidance legislation in 
response to case law. Both jurisdictions have granted their tax 
authorities sweeping powers, and in both cases these are 
seldom used. In that respect, they follow what Franzoni (1998) 
described as the logical optimal solution. Senior figures in both 
taxing authorities have publicly expressed their distaste for tax 
avoidance as well as tax evasion, and indicated an eagerness to 
pursue both activities, even though the courts in both countries 
have recognized the Duke of Westminster principle that a 
taxpayer cannot be compelled to pay an increased tax.  
Both jurisdictions use the threat of audit as a deterrent, 
in accordance with practices outlined by Reinganum and Wilde 
(1985), although the Irish Revenue are moving to select audit 
cases more on the basis of likely underpayment. Both countries 
use settlements, and have had two general tax amnesties. In 
Ireland the first amnesty was more successful than the second, 
in common with international experience. In South Africa the 
second amnesty has not yet run its course at the time of writing 
and its success cannot yet be measured. Both jurisdictions are 
moving towards the wider application of group norming 
techniques. 
To some extent these similarities may be due to the fact 
that UK common law forms the basis for case precedent in both 
countries. Nevertheless the contrasts between the countries 
arguably outweigh this common bond. Ireland is a small 
homogenous country of four million citizens which has enjoyed 
political stability for eighty years. South Africa is a very young 
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democracy, a rainbow nation, with eleven official languages 
and a population of forty-four million. Given these contrasts, it 
is striking that two countries have such a similar approach to 
the issues of evasion and avoidance.  It suggests that some 
universality in Revenue approaches exists. 
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